I. Introduction

Airline industry mergers in the late 2000s and early 2010s transformed the four largest airlines into an effective oligopoly. As a result of these combinations, legacy carriers went from controlling 56 percent to 80 percent of the domestic market. As it stands, the "Big Three" carriers (United Airlines, American Airlines, and Delta Air Lines) have a stronghold on the sector, with each company leveraging control of strategic airline hubs to maintain its dominance. Reduced competition in airlines means that fliers have fewer travel options, which empowers airlines to raise prices and lower quality of service. This year, United CEO Scott Kirby has accelerated his efforts to further reduce competition in domestic airlines through combinations with another major carrier. 

In February, Kirby pitched a United-American merger to President Donald Trump before approaching American itself. American publicly rejected the proposal in April, prompting Kirby to acknowledge that a deal could not move forward without a willing partner. Kirby's effort to curry favor with the Trump administration ahead of an anti-competitive merger bid without consulting the other party involved is a revealing one. During the second Trump administration, corporations seeking antitrust approval for merger efforts that would fail to pass antitrust muster in a past administration have undergone charm offensives for the White House.

After the failed American Airlines gambit earlier this year, Kirby has pivoted to downplaying his interests in mergers more generally. In the aftermath, rumors emerged surrounding the possibility of a merger with JetBlue, which Kirby would ultimately dismiss, at least in the immediate future. As The Wall Street Journal reported in July 2026, United under Kirby had approached Delta about a combination in 2025, which, like a theoretical United-AA merger, would constitute a "mega-merger." Despite his efforts to distance himself from the 2026 AA gambit, Kirby in September reaffirmed his belief that a combination with American Airlines would be beneficial for consumers. In the interview, Kirby also detailed United's other ambitions to entrench its dominance, including through a 40 to 50-gate connecting hub in Miami, building out its operation at JFK, and building a broader international network. Kirby’s about-face on mergers after months of pretending he was disinterested in further consolidation suggests that United is simply waiting for a more favorable political environment to revive its merger campaign. 

II. Kirby's Consolidation Agenda

IMPACT OF A PROPOSED UNITED-AA DEAL

The prospect of a United-American combination has been met with widespread alarm among consumer advocates. In the spring of 2026, amid news concerning Kirby’s effort to court Trump’s favor for such a deal, observers noted that the potential combination stands to decimate competition in airlines. By combining the two carriers, which both control major hubs and currently contest crucial “battlegrounds” such as Chicago O’Hare, the airline sector would effectively be dominated by a single entity. If the two combined, the resulting corporation would control some 40% of domestic capacity and at least half of capacity at 159 airports. The combination of two “Big Three” legacy carriers would create, at best, a duopoly should Delta also stand to remain competitive; should the resulting entity render Delta uncompetitive, it would create a de facto monopoly in the airline sector. 

In the recent interview, Kirby claimed that major carriers do not meaningfully compete on price to make the case that further combinations would benefit consumers. This claim is itself dubious: while true competition in the airline sector is rare, it is clear that major airports that feature the presence of two major carriers competing have lower fares on average than monopoly hubs. In any event, if Kirby’s claim is to be believed, this would be evidence of the necessity of promoting real competition in the industry, not allowing more consolidation. In the 2010s, researchers analyzed the so-called “JetBlue effect,” noting that the carrier’s presence was generally associated with declines in fares for passengers compared with the other low-cost airlines studied. 

William Kovacic, a former chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has argued that the route and metropolitan overlaps between the carriers were too extensive for divestitures to correct. In April, a bipartisan Senate inquiry into the proposed merger concluded that the resulting entity, the single largest airline in the world, would harm fliers by reducing competitive pressure to lower fares. The prospect of further job losses as a result of a merger was also raised. 

CRONY TACTICS

In the second Trump administration, corporations seeking approval for anticompetitive mergers have worked to curry favor with the White House. This notably includes tech companies’ obvious overtures to the White House amid antitrust scrutiny from both the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It has also encompassed leveraging connections to lobbyists with White House influence, a tactic used by companies such as HPE and Live Nation. It is telling that Kirby chose to approach Donald Trump to pitch the idea for a merger that would have obvious anti-competitive consequences before reaching out to American Airlines itself. The industry has also cultivated an unusually sympathetic regulator in Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy. Before joining the administration, Duffy worked as a lobbyist at BGR Government Affairs, where he represented the Partnership for Open Skies, a coalition including United, American, and Delta. Under Duffy, DOT revoked numerous pro-consumer initiatives initiated by the Biden-era DOT, including delay compensation rules for passengers. On his part, Duffy has indicated he may favor further airline industry consolidation.

GATE ACCESS IMPLICATIONS

As we noted in analysis published in June, gate access has become an increasingly important airline competition issue. As it stands, dominant carriers are able to leverage their control over gate access at major airports to prevent rivals from expanding. Earlier this year, United was the subject of controversy over its strategy of overscheduling flights to effectively game the gate allocation system at Chicago O’Hare. The company was willing to risk delays or cancellations of thousands of passengers for the purpose of reducing American Airlines’ footprint at the airport. The FAA ultimately had to step in to prevent further disruption caused directly by United’s anti-competitive practices at O’Hare. 

While this brought short-term relief at O’Hare, United is unlikely to abandon its broader strategy of pursuing control over gate access in strategically important airports at any cost. In the recent interview, Kirby noted his ambition to establish up to 50 United gates at Miami International Airport. The airport, considered a “fortress hub” for American Airlines, is of unusual strategic importance given its status as a gateway for travelers to Latin America. Kirby’s prioritization of gaining gate access, rather than improving quality of service to entice flyers, reflects a company whose expansion strategy centers on limiting competition, not winning passengers on the merits.

III. Conclusion

The prospect of a United-American mega-merger remains a potential death knell for what remains of legacy carrier competition. Kirby’s decision to court Trump’s approval for a plainly anti-competitive merger, particularly before reaching out to the other airline involved, suggests that he understands the deal would not pass antitrust muster without political favors.